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IV

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction under

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court properly determined that Defendant was not engaged
in substantial and continuous local activity, tantamount to doing business, sufficient to
confer general personal jurisdiction.
Standard of Review: An appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision presents
only legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).
However, to the extent Plaintiff is attacking the trial court's finding that
Defendant's leasing real property in Wendover, Utah, was related to, but not necessary
to, its hotel and casino business in Nevada, the standard is clearly erroneous. Alta
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).
It should be noted, too, that the matter was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing
below. Record at 269, p.27. Plaintiff declined to present evidence at the evidentiary
hearing. Record at 270.
2. Whether the trial court properly determined that Plaintiff's injuries did not
arise out of Defendant's contacts with Utah and that Utah's long arm statute thus did
not confer specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
1

Standard of Review. An appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision presents
only legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-24 (1996) provides in pertinent part:

Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as
to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;

(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or
by breach of warranty . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Plaintiff sued State Line Hotel, Inc., a Nevada corporation,
for personal injuries she sustained in a slip and fall which occurred in the food buffet
line at State Line's hotel and casino property in Wendover, Nevada. Plaintiff's
complaint sounds in negligence. Record at 1-4.
Course of Proceedings Below. State Line Hotel did not answer Plaintiff's
complaint, but filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Based on Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction. Record at 14-16. After the motion was fully briefed, it was
argued on June 30, 1997. The trial court made a partial ruling, see record at 269, p.
2

26-27, and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing, allowing limited discovery in the
interim. Record at 269, p. 27-28.
Plaintiff sent interrogatories and requests for documents to State Line, and the
evidentiary hearing proceeded on September 15, 1997. Plaintiff chose not to present
evidence at the hearing, record at 270, but submitted a supplemental memorandum
prior to the hearing. Record at 104-62.
The trial court granted State Line Hotel's motion to dismiss. Record at 247-52,
270, p. 20-23, and Plaintiff appealed.
Statement of Facts.
1.

The State Line Hotel, Inc. is a Nevada corporation which owns and

operates the State Line Hotel and Casino in Wendover, Nevada. Record at 11-12, 248.
2.

On July 29, 1995, Plaintiff slipped and fell on the premises of the State

Line Hotel and Casino while going through a food buffet line. Record at 1-4, 248.
3.

State Line Hotel advertises its Nevada hotel and casino in Utah. Record

at 12, 248.
4.

State Line Hotel contracts for goods and services from entities in several

states including Utah and Nevada. Record at 12, 249.
5.

At the time of Plaintiffs fall, State Line Hotel contracted with State Line

Properties, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, which took reservations from Utah
residents for hotel rooms, golf packages, gaming tournaments, shows, and
3

entertainment. The general partner of State Line Properties, Ltd., was State Line
Properties, Inc., a Utah corporation. Record at 12.
6.

State Line Hotel, the Nevada corporate defendant, owns stock in the Utah

corporation, State Line Properties. State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line
Properties, Ltd., along with several other entities, are named insureds under the same
insurance policy as State Line Hotel, Inc. Record at 249.
7.

State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line Properties, Ltd. own five

parcels of real property in Wendover, Utah, which they lease to State Line Hotel, Inc.
Two of the parcels are used for parking lot, parking structure, and signage purposes
relating to Defendant's hotel and casino business. The city of Wendover leases a
storage unit at Decker Field to State Line Hotel. Record at 249.
8.

State Line's leasing of incidental parcels of real property including

signage and parking areas, while directly related to the carrying on of its business in
Nevada, is not an integral part of the business in the sense that the hotel and casino
could not continue without it. Record at 249.
9.

State Line Hotel does not own any real property in Utah. Record at 249.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. The activities of the State Line Hotel are not substantial and continuous and
tantamount to doing business in Utah. The business of the State Line Hotel is operating
a hotel and casino in Nevada. In carrying out this business, it contracts with vendors
4

from Nevada and other states, including Utah, for goods and services. It advertises its
business in Utah and other states. It leases some parcels of real property in Wendover,
Utah, for purposes related to its business in Nevada. The leases are incidental, but not
necessary, to carrying on its hotel and casino business.
Plaintiffs injuries did not arise from State Line's contacts with Utah.
Moreover, State Line Hotel's contacts with Utah are not so substantial and continuous
as to constitute doing business in Utah. State Line Hotel would not have reasonably
anticipated being haled into court in Utah for any lawsuit.
The majority of courts have held that advertising and promoting one's business
in another state do not constitute doing business. Cases relied on by plaintiff are
distinguishable and involve significantly more contact than mere promotion of business.
In addition, Plaintiff relies on cases which have been reversed for the notion that but
for the State Line's advertising in Utah, she would not have gone to Wendover, slipped
in the food buffet line, and been injured.
Since State Line's activities in Utah do not constitute doing business, there is no
general personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel.
II. Unquestionably, Plaintiffs injuries did not arise out of State Line Hotel's (1)
entering into transactions in Utah, or (2) causing an injury in Utah. Thus, there is no
specific personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel. Even if there were, however, the
court must employ a due process analysis to determine whether State Line Hotel could
5

reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Utah and must balance the forum state's
interest in the litigation with that of the foreign state and the parties.
In this case, again, Plaintiff's injuries did not arise from any conduct of State
Line Hotel in Utah. As stated in Plaintiff's complaint, State Line's alleged misconduct
was in failing to provide reasonably safe premises. Thus, State Line Hotel could not
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Utah for Plaintiff's slip and fall which
occurred in Nevada.
Utah does not have nearly the interest in adjudicating Plaintiff s claim as does
Nevada, a state with a strong interest in ensuring that hotels and casinos are maintained
in a reasonably safe condition. Plaintiff's interest in having her claim efficiently and
fairly litigated would have been promoted in Nevada.
Accordingly, Utah's long arm statute does not confer specific personal
jurisdiction over State Line Hotel.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT
Jurisdiction over the person is broken down into two categories. A court can
have general jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The Utah
Supreme Court has stated:

6

General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a
defendant without regard to the subject of the claim asserted. For such
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and
continuous local activity in the forum state. In contrast, specific personal
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to
claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum
state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have certain
minimum local contacts.
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)
(emphasis added) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984); Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6
(Utah 1978)).
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Associates, Inc., 618 P.2d
1004 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court explained the distinction between the "minimal
contact" and "doing business" standards.
The significance of the difference is found in part in the distinction
between general jurisdiction and special jurisdiction. If the defendant's
nexus with the state is such that he is "doing business" in the state, the
jurisdiction of the court applies generally and he is rendered amenable in
the state courts for any cause of action. This jurisdictional standard is
embodied in U.R.C.P. § 4(e)(4), and the Long Arm Statute need not be
employed. Conversely, if the activities of the defendant are limited in
nature or transitory in duration, the courts may assume jurisdiction over
that person only in relation to causes of action related to the activity of the
defendant in the state. To assume this "special" jurisdiction, the courts
must employ the Long Arm Statute.
Id. at 1006 n.4 (citing Producer's Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 605
(Utah 1978); Strachan, In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 235
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(1977)). See alsQ Abbot G.M. Diesel, 578 P.2d at 853 n.6, wherein the court, quoting
the Strachan article, stated that general personal jurisdiction requires "substantial and
continuous local activity"; Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980)
(defendant was not doing business in Utah which would require substantial and
continuous activity; defendant did not sell products for use in Utah except to plaintiff).
A. Advertising in Another State is Generally Insufficient
to Confer General Personal Jurisdiction
Virtually all individual and corporate residents of states have some contact with
other states. State Line Hotel purchases advertising in Utah and contracts with Utah
vendors for the supply of food products and supplies. Record at 12. In regard to
advertising, State Line Hotel is like any other lodging or entertainment operation
located in one state which promotes its business to citizens of another state. Many
courts have held that advertising and promotion are not "doing business" sufficient to
give rise to general jurisdiction.
In State ex rel. Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461
(1993), an Oregon resident traveled to Reno, Nevada, and stayed at a hotel operated by
Circus Circus. The plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a liquor bottle thrown by
an unknown person from a window of the hotel. He sued Circus Circus, claiming
negligence. In Oregon, general jurisdiction can be obtained over a defendant who is
engaged in "substantial and not isolated activities within this state." 854 P.2d at 462.
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The plaintiff argued that Circus Circus was subject to the state's general jurisdiction.
The Court listed the contacts of Circus Circus with Oregon:
It is undisputed by the parties that Circus Circus is not registered to
do business in Oregon, pays no business tax here, and has no bank
accounts, offices, real estate, employees, or exclusive agents in the state.
[Plaintiff] argues, however, that the activities of Circus Circus in Oregon
nevertheless are "substantial," because Circus Circus "regularly advertises
its Reno hotel in The Oregonian, because it distributed brochures
describing that hotel to Smith's Oregon travel agent, because it maintains
a toll-free number for use of Oregon residents, and because, after Smith
reserved a room at its Reno hotel, Circus Circus called Smith at his
Oregon residence to confirm the reservation."
Id.
The court stated that it was not persuaded that the foregoing activities were
substantial and not isolated activities within the state. The court then rejected the
specific jurisdiction argument because the immediate effects of the plaintiff's injury
were felt within Nevada and not within Oregon as required by Oregon's long-arm
statute. Id. at 463.
InMunley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988), the
plaintiff, a Nevada resident, was injured at a Lake Tahoe ski resort called "Northstar."
He sued Northstar in Nevada but Northstar claimed a lack of personal jurisdiction. The
court listed Northstar's contacts with Nevada:
The evidence presented to the district court shows that Northstar's
contacts with Nevada consisted solely of advertising and promotional
activities. These activities included continuous membership in the
Reno/Sparks Chamber of Commerce since 1984, the maintenance of a
9

contract with a Reno outdoor advertising company, the placement of one
advertisement in the Las Vegas Review Journal, the placement of an
advertisement in the Reno telephone directory, and the distribution of
brochures to several ski shops and sporting goods stores in the Reno area.
Id. at 415.
The court in Munley rejected any argument that the requirements for general
jurisdiction had been met. "None of Northstar's promotional activities evince a pattern
of 'substantial and continuous' activities within this state sufficient to give rise to a
presence in Nevada and to confer general jurisdiction on the district court." Id. at
416.
Similarly, in Congoleum Corp. v. D.L.W. Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240
(9th Cir. 1984), the court of appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the German defendant. In that case, the
defendant's only activities in the forum state of California consisted of sales and
marketing efforts through a California company and a consultant. The activities of the
company and the consultant as agents for D.L.W. consisted of the solicitation of
orders, the recommendation of other sales agents, the ordering of samples, the
promotion of D.L.W. products to potential customers through mail and showroom
display, and attendance at trade shows and sales meetings. In affirming the dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court stated:
Although many courts cite Perkins [v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952)] for the principle that personal jurisdiction may be asserted where
10

the cause of action is unrelated to the forum activity, no court has ever
held that the maintenance of even a substantial sales force within the state
is a sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated cause of
action.
Id. at 1242 (emphasis added).
In this case, State Line Hotel contracted with State Line Properties, Ltd., a Utah
limited partnership, for the purpose of taking reservations for hotel rooms, gaming
tournaments, golf tournaments and entertainment. Record at 12. The activities of State
Line Properties, Ltd., on behalf of State Line Hotel, Inc. are similar to the activities of
the California company and consultant as agents for D.L.W. in Cong oleum Corp.
Accordingly, the activities of State Line Properties, Ltd. on behalf of State Line Hotel,
Inc. are insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over State Line Hotel, Inc. for the
purpose of litigating unrelated causes of action.
In MGM Grand, Inc. v. District Court, 807 P.2d 201 (Nev. 1991), MGM sued
Walt Disney Company seeking a declaratory judgment permitting it to use the MGM
name, logos and trademarks on a movie theme park it intended to build in Las Vegas.
Disney moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the district court granted
the motion. MGM argued, however, that Disney, because of its contacts with Nevada,
was subject to the general jurisdiction of Nevada's state courts. The Nevada Supreme
Court disagreed.
Our conclusion that an exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
improper is bolstered by an examination of each of the potential bases for
11

jurisdiction. To begin, the exercise of general jurisdiction is not
appropriate, because Disney's own contacts with the State of Nevada,
which amount to no more than advertising and promoting the company's
California theme parks, are neither continuous nor systematic. See
Munley v. Second Judicial District Court, 104 Nev. 492, 496, 761 P.2d
414, 416 (1988) (in-state advertising and promotion not sufficient to
create general jurisdiction).
807 P.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
Finally, in Price & Sons v. District Court, 831 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), the court
held that the Nevada courts did not have general jurisdiction over an out-of-state
membership department store, the Price Club, which had over 1,000 members in
Nevada. The Price Club regularly sent advertisements to its members and solicited
memberships in Nevada through an advertising flyer distributed through a Nevada
credit union. The court noted that general personal jurisdiction over a defendant for
any cause of action is appropriate where the defendant's forum activities are so
substantial or continuous and systematic that the defendant may be deemed to be
present in the forum state. "A high level of contact with the forum state is necessary to
establish general jurisdiction. Sales and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign
corporation, without more, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction." Id. at 601
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In this case, State Line Hotel advertises its hotel and casino operation in Utah
and contracted with a Utah limited partnership to take reservations from Utah residents
for hotel rooms, gaming tournaments, golf tournaments and entertainment. State Line
12

Hotel's promotion of its Nevada hotel and casino is no different from Walt Disney's
promotion of Disneyland or a destination resort's promotion of its facilities to citizens
of other states. Advertising in a forum state is not tantamount to having a presence
there. State Line Hotel does not do business in Utah and is not amenable to general
personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff claims that State Line's advertising and promotional activities are
sufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction, citing Weintraub v. Walt Disney
World, 825 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Pa. 1993), in support. Weintraub, however, involved
much more extensive forum contact that mere advertising. The key in Weintraub was
activities of Disney in the forum, including conducting a business seminar in
Pittsburgh, Disney representatives visiting Pennsylvania for college relations, Disney
representatives visiting Pennsylvania for professional staffing purposes, and Disney's
publicity staff visiting Pennsylvania. Id. at 721-22.
Similarly, Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Co., 630 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa.
1986), involved more extensive activities than merely advertising and promoting the
theme park. On reconsideration, 646 F. Supp. 786, the court emphasized that Walt
Disney World recruited the City of Philadelphia to join in promoting the theme park.
In connection with the "Disney Salutes Philadelphia" campaign, city representatives
spent two days at Walt Disney World at Disney's expense. These activities (and
others) were in addition to advertising. 646 F. Supp. at 788.
13

Plaintiff also relies on Boone v. Silver Creek Resort, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 495
(S.D. Ind. 1990), which involved an Indiana resident's injury at a Kentucky resort.
The distinguishing factors in Boone were that the resort owners only mailed
promotional materials to Indiana residents who had prior connection with the resort
through previous inquiry or visits (not to Indiana residents in general). The court
apparently believed an un-targeted advertising campaign would be less likely to resuL
in general personal jurisdiction. Significant, also, was the fact that the resort owner
annually attended an Indianapolis boat show and there entered into "contractual
relationships with Indiana residents whereby prospective guests make a down payment
and sign a written agreement to use the resort." Id. at 198 n.5.
B. State Line's Leasing Incidental Parcels of Real
Property in Utah is not Enough to Confer General Jurisdiction
With respect to the State Line Hotel's leasing of real property in Wendover,
Utah, the trial court observed and ruled:
I think the leasing of incidental parcels, and in that, I am including
the signage and the parking structure and the parking lot. While those are
clearly directly related to the carrying on of a casino business, they're not
integral in the sense that the casino could not, in some fashion or another,
continue.
The leasing of those parcels is insufficient to convey general
jurisdiction such that the defendants are liable for all of their actions to
any Utah plaintiff in a Utah court.
Certainly, if one of the leased parcels was the [site] of the slip and
fall, that would be sufficient; but I guess I'm just troubled by a slip and
14

fall occurring in Nevada, resulting in jurisdiction in Utah when there is
not a generalized presence in Utah.
Record at 270, p. 21.
Plaintiff has not cited any authority for the proposition that a foreign defendant's
leasing incidental parcels of real property in the forum state will result in the
defendant's being haled into court for all purposes.
Plaintiff does, however, miscite Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), apparently for the proposition that leasing real property may
result in a finding of general personal jurisdiction. The sole issue in Hebertson was
whether the owners of the real property on which the plaintiff was injured did business as
Willowcreek Plaza, which was the name given to the property. Id. at 840. The court,
however, made reference to doing business for jurisdictional purposes and listed the
ownership of property as a factor to consider. Id. at 840-41. The court cited Radcliffe v.
Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). As set forth below, Radcliffe was a specific
personal jurisdiction case.
As the trial court found, State Line Hotel's leasing of small parcels of real property
in Wendover, Utah, for purposes incidental, but not necessary, to its hotel and casino
business in Wendover, Nevada, is insufficient to justify conferring general personal
jurisdiction over State Line.

15

C. The Relationship of State Line Hotel, Inc. to the
Utah Entities is Irrelevant
Plaintiffs smoke screen issues include the Nevada corporate defendant's
relationship to some Utah entities and the insurance policy's coverage of these entities
and other related entities in the same policy. Plaintiff neither cites authority for her
contention that these circumstances support conferring general personal jurisdiction,
nor does she explain the significance. In fact, the circumstances are legally irrelevant.
In Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974), a case
involving a non-resident parent company of a resident subsidiary company, the court
noted that a "parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated
separately from the subsidiary in the absence of circumstances justifying disregard of
the corporate entity." Id. at 1362. "Circumstances justify disregard of the corporate
entity if separation of the two entities has not been maintained and injustice would
occur to third parties if the separate entity were recognized." Id.
Plaintiff argues, essentially, that because the defendant Nevada corporation,
State Line Hotel, Inc., has some ownership interest in State Line Properties, Inc., a
Utah corporation, State Line Hotel can expect to be haled into court in Utah for general
purposes. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized, however, that unless
corporate formalities have not been followed, the separate corporate existence is

16

recognized. Id. Plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever relating to corporate
formalities.1
D. Utah Specific Personal Jurisdiction Cases
do not Support Conferring General Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff cites three Utah cases in support of her argument that the trial court
should have exercised general personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel.2 In Radcliffe
v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Kauftnann (the non-resident) and
Akhavan entered into an agreement for Kauftnann to buy Akhavan's interest in a Utah
1

At the conclusion of the hearing on State Line Hotel's Motion to Dismiss, the trial
court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing at Plaintiffs suggestion and allowed Plaintiff some
limited discovery on "the question of doing business within the State of Utah not related to
advertising or common stockholders, but simply the question of whether they exercise the privilege
of doing business within the State[.]" Record at 269, p. 28. At the scheduled evidentiary hearing,
Plaintiff elected not to present evidence. Record at 270. Instead, Plaintiff filed a supplemental
memorandum prior to the hearing. Record at 104-162.
This is significant. In Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), the court held that pretrial jurisdictional issues could be
determined based on affidavits alone, discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 827. If the
determination proceeded on documentary evidence alone (affidavits or discovery), Plaintiff is only
required to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs factual allegations are
accepted as true unless controverted by affidavits or depositions, but factual disputes are to be
resolved in Plaintiffs favor and the court cannot weigh evidence unless a hearing is held. Id.
As indicated, at the hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff suggested that
an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate and the court agreed. Record at 269, p. 27. Plaintiff
engaged in written discovery, declined to take depositions and declined to call witnesses and present
evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff cannot now claim that she was only required to make
a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction because the court's jurisdiction ruling was based on
discovery and affidavits. Once she requested and got her evidentiary hearing, she was required to
meet her burden of proving jurisdiction.
2

Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d
791 (Utah 1988) and Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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corporation. Thereafter Kaufmann's agent sued Akhavan and others for fraudulent
misrepresentation and Akhavan counterclaimed against Kaufmann and others for breach
of contract.
The Court held that Akhavan's claim against Kaufmann "clearly [arose] from
Kaufmann's transaction of business within this state." Id. at 611. The Court noted
that the issue was governed by the long-arm statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24,
which provided that any person who transacts business in Utah, submits himself to the
jurisdiction of Utah Courts as to any claims arising from transacting business in Utah.
The Court also held that finding personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann did not violate
due process because he met with Akhavan in Utah on three occasions to negotiate the
purchase of the business and thus anticipated being haled into court in Utah. Id. at 612.
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988), also involved a lawsuit arising
out of a contractual relationship between a non-Utah resident and Utah residents. In
that case, Bradford, a Mississippi native, came to Utah and negotiated the purchase of
an apartment. When the seller refused to buy the apartment back under the terms of
the contract, Bradford sued in Mississippi, obtained a default judgment and attempted
to enforce the judgment in Utah. The contract was signed by Bradford in Mississippi
and there were some communications between the parties in their respective states, but
the trial court ruled that the contacts were insufficient and set the judgment aside. The
Supreme Court upheld the trial court. As in Radcliffe v. Akhavan, the analysis was
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only under the long-arm statute. The Court ruled in Bradford that assuming that the
Utah residents' conduct fell under Mississippi's long-arm statute, there were
insufficient contacts to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 794.
The Court noted:
In the instant case, [the Utah] defendants did not solicit the sale of
the property. Rather, it was plaintiff who initiated the negotiations by
telephone after personally inspecting the property in Utah. The contract
of sale was to be performed solely in Utah, and the fact that part payment
was received from Mississippi is, in this case, insufficient to fulfill
minimum contact requirements. Defendants did not visit Mississippi, nor
did they deliberately engage in "significant activities" or purposefully
create "substantial connections," continuing relationships, and obligations
with Mississippi residents to give defendants a fair and reasonable
warning that their activity would subject them to Mississippi's
jurisdiction.
Id. at 795. Plaintiff also cites to Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995), for reasons that are unclear.
Cases such as Radcliffe and Bradford involving, as they do, conduct specified in
long-arm statutes, out of which the causes of action arose, are not dispositive or helpful
in resolving in this case whether the Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over
the State Line. Plaintiff points to contacts the State Line has with Utah, but Plaintiff's
cause of action did not arise out of those contacts. Utah's long-arm statute clearly
requires the conduct to arise out of specified contacts for the court to exercise special
personal jurisdiction. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-24(1996).
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It is only if general personal jurisdiction exists (as contrasted with specific
personal jurisdiction, arising under the long arm statute), that this lawsuit should
remain in Utah. For general personal jurisdiction to exist, there must be "substantial
and continuous local activity" to the point that the defendant is "doing business" in the
foreign state. See Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d
1004 (Utah 1980); Abbot GM. Diesel, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978) (both citing Strachan,
In personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1911 Utah L. Rev. 235 (1977)). the Court in Price
& Sons v. District Court, 831 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), noted, "[a] high level of contact
with the forum state is necessary to establish general jurisdiction." Id. at 601.
In her brief, Plaintiff points to a couple of service contracts (out of 28
vendor/service contracts identified in discovery), a few leases {not ownership) of real
property in Wendover on the Utah side, and some telephone numbers to support her
argument that the State Line has sufficient contacts with Utah to justify a finding of
personal jurisdiction. Virtually all people and businesses have contact with other states.
Even numerous small contacts do not constitute substantial and continuous local activity
tantamount to doing business. The State Line Hotel, Inc., does business in Nevada, but
deals with some Utah businesses, many Nevada businesses and businesses in various
other states in carrying out its Nevada business.
The State Line has been very careful to keep its doing of business in Nevada.
(Indeed, its business is uniquely Nevadan by nature.) It does not own property in Utah;
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it does not employ people in Utah. It is absolutely irrelevant what contacts the Utah
entities, State Line Properties, Inc. and Ltd., have with Utah. The issue is what State
Line Hotel, Inc., does in Utah. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving that
the State Line has substantial and continuous local activity in Utah.
II.
PLAINTIFFS INJURIES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF DEFENDANT'S
CONTACTS WITH UTAH; THEREFORE, NO SPECIFIC
PERSONAL JURISDICTION EXISTS
To determine whether specific personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel, Inc.
exists, one must turn to Utah's long arm statute.
provides:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-24 (1996)

Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as
to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;

(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or
by breach of warranty . . . .
(Emphasis added).
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A. Plaintiff's Injuries Must Arise Out of Defendant's Contacts
With Utah for the Long Arm Statute to Apply
Plaintiff's injuries did not arise from the transaction of any business by the
Defendant within Utah. Plaintiff was not injured as a result of advertising or promotion
of the State Line Hotel, nor as a result of State Line Hotel, Inc.'s obtaining goods and
services from Utah vendors and businesses nor as a result of State Line's leasing
incidental parcels of real property in Utah. See record at 270, p. 21. Unquestionably,
the injury was not caused in Utah.
There is no question but that the alleged injury must arise out of the Defendants'
contacts with Utah for Utah to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants
under the long-arm statute. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1311
(Utah 1980). In Roskelley, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it does not assist
plaintiff to show the contacts defendant has with Utah if the specific litigation does not
arise out of any of these contacts. Id. See also Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 (Utah 1978) ('"where the defendant has only
minimum contacts with the forum [i.e., no general jurisdiction exists], personal
jurisdiction may be asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's forum-state
activity.'") (citation omitted.)
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Finally, there is a constitutional "due process" element to personal jurisdiction.
InArguello v. Indus. Woodworking Machine Co.} 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the nonresident defendant must have "minimum contacts with the forum state
such that the maintenance of this suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.f"
Id. at 1123, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
The defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Utah and must have reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in Utah. Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co.} Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (citations omitted). In addition, the court must balance the convenience of the
parties and the interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction by examining the
relationship of the defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other. Id.
Although State Line Hotel purposefully availed itself of purchasing advertising,
food products and supplies in Utah, it cannot be said that, as a result, it reasonably
anticipated being summoned into a Utah court for a slip and fall accident that occurred
in Nevada, on its premises.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court discussed the concept of minimum contacts. It stated:
It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their
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courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted that although the
limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the due process clause have been relaxed over
the years, "we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 293. The Court noted that although
the framers of the Constitution foresaw that the nation would be a common market,
they also
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty,
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.
The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all its sister States - a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 293.
Finally, the Court observed that the due process clause does not contemplate that
a state can make binding judgments against individuals or corporate defendants with
which the state has no contacts, ties or relations.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
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In applying the relevant factors listed by the Court in determining the
reasonableness of requiring a foreign defendant to litigate a case in the forum, none of
the factors support keeping this case in Utah. Utah has little interest in adjudicating
this personal injury lawsuit which arose in Nevada between a Nevada corporation and a
Utah resident. Certainly Utah has much less interest in adjudicating this dispute than
does Nevada. Although the Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, her interests would have been promoted by litigating her suit in
Nevada, a state which has a keen interest in ensuring safe environments for visitors to
its hotels and casinos.
B. Plaintiffs Injuries Did Not, Factually or Legally, Arise Out of
Defendant's Advertising Its Business in Utah
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges a negligence cause of action. Record at 1-4.
She claims she slipped and fell while walking through a food buffet line, that Defendant
owed her a duty to act in a reasonable and safe manner and that it breached that duty.
She claims she was injured as a result and is entitled to special and general damages.
In her brief, however, Plaintiff claims that this court has specific personal
jurisdiction over the State Line because her injury arose out of State Line's advertising
and promotional activities in Utah. Brief of Appellant at 15-16.
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There is no record support for Plaintiffs claim that her injuries arose from
Defendant's advertising, but even if there were, that would not change the fact that her
injuries did not arise out of the advertising.
Plaintiff relies on two decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
both of which have been vacated or reversed? Plaintiff relies on Alexander v. Circus
Circus Enterprises, Inc., 939 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1991), for that court's analysis, which
is that but for the defendant's forum-related activities in soliciting business, the plaintiff
would not have gone to the defendant's place of business and been injured. Id. at 853.
The court in Alexander relied on Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th
Cir. 1990).
As stated, neither Alexander nor Shute are good law. In Alexander v. Circus
Circus Enterprises, Inc., 972 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals withdrew
its earlier opinion reported at 939 F.2d 847, upon which Plaintiff relies. In the later
decision, the court granted the defendant's petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior
opinion, and affirmed the district court's quashing service of summons and dismissing
the complaint based on absence of personal jurisdiction. 972 F.2d at 262. Shute was
reversed in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). On remand to
the Ninth Circuit, 934 F.2d 1091, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the

3

Plaintiff also relied on these cases below, record at 39, 45-47, and State Line pointed
out below that the cases were no longer good law. Record at 75-76.
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district court which had originally granted the cruise line's motion for summary
judgment on lack of personal jurisdiction.
To the extent the Ninth Circuit's "but for" analysis survives, however, it is a
distinctly minority position and has been sharply criticized. In State ex rel. Circus
Circus v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461 (1993), the Oregon Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiff's request to adopt the "but for" test.
The Supreme Court of the United States does not apply a "but for" test,
and our reading of the pertinent Supreme Court cases convinces us that
the Supreme Court would not do so. We therefore decline Smith's
invitation to adopt the proposed "but for" test.
854-P.2d at 466. See also Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264,
267 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (most courts addressing the issue have concluded that when
plaintiffs bring actions for personal injuries that occurred in another state and which
allegedly resulted from the defendant's negligent acts which also occurred in another
state, the cause of action does not arise from the defendant's forum contacts for
purposes of asserting personal jurisdiction).
In State ex rel. Circus Circus, the court noted that by advertising its Reno
facilities in a major Oregon newspaper, providing brochures to the plaintiff's travel
agent, making available to Oregon residents a toll-free telephone information service,
and telephoning plaintiff to confirm his hotel reservations, defendant purposefully
directed its activities at residents of Oregon. "However, Smith's negligence claim
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against Circus Circus does not 'arise out of or relate to' the activities of Circus Circus
in Oregon." 854 P.2d at 466 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985)). The court noted that plaintiff claimed that he was injured by a bottle thrown
from a window of a hotel and that his injuries resulted from Circus Circus's negligence
relating solely to the operation of its hotel in Nevada. Id.
Similarly, mMunley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev.
1988), the court noted that even if Northstar's promotional activities in Nevada
constituted transacting business, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his cause of
action arose from those activities. The court specifically noted that the plaintiff alleged
in his Complaint that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligent
management, maintenance and operation of the ski chair lifts in California. "Indeed,
there is nothing in the record suggesting that Northstar's promotional activities in
Nevada were related to its alleged negligence in maintaining and operating its
California chair lifts." Id. at 415 (citations omitted). Significantly, the court held that
Northstar's promotional activities did not confer jurisdiction on the district court "even
though petitioner's trip to Northstar was in response to such promotional activities."
Id. at 416 (citing Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 546,
174 Cal. Rptr. 885,900(1981)).
The plaintiff in Munley, like the plaintiff herein, relied on Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), in claiming that his cause of action was required only
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to "relate to" the defendant's acts in Nevada. The Nevada Supreme Court properly
distinguished Burger King from the facts of the case before it. In Burger King,
Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident, entered into a franchise contract with Burger King, a
Florida corporation. Burger King thereafter sued Rudzewicz in Florida for breach of
the franchise contract. In holding that Florida's long arm statute conferred jurisdiction
on the Florida courts, the Supreme Court concluded that Rudzewicz had deliberately
reached out beyond his home and established a substantial 20-year contractual
relationship with Burger King in Florida. The court concluded that the franchise
dispute grew directly out of a contract which was substantially connected to Florida.
761 P.2d at 416. "The Burger King opinion thus suggests that the cause of action must
have a specific and direct relationship or be intimately related to the forum contacts."
Id.
Plaintiff's specific personal jurisdiction argument is really a general personal
jurisdiction argument because it urges the Court to find personal jurisdiction based on
State Line's Utah activities for an injury which occurred out of state. In Union Ski Co.
v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court
observed that it is generally more fair and logical to find jurisdiction in the forum
where the activity occurred out of which the cause of action arose. Id. at 1259. In this
case, the Plaintiff's cause of action arose, not out of Defendant's transaction of
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business, but out of alleged negligence which occurred in Nevada. Thus, there is no
specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, State Line Hotel, Inc., respectfully requests that the
court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of August, 1998.
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE

CynthikK.C. Meyer
Attorneys for Defendant State Line
Hotel, Inc.
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